Articles

A series of recent attacks in the embattled region involving notably larger numbers of better-armed, better-trained insurgents operating in well-organized units indicates that separatist field commanders are seeking to increase the pressure on Thai security forces, seize more weapons, and possibly shift the insurgency as a whole into higher gear.

The harder-hitting attacks, which mark a significant break with insurgent tactics in recent years, pose no real threat to Thai military control over the conflict-ridden border provinces.

But a higher tempo of violence involving larger guerrilla assaults and necessarily more aggressive counter-measures will inevitably undermine Bangkok's "politics-first" strategy for tamping down the conflict. Escalation also stands to impact on the still tentative peace process being pursued by government and separatist representatives while at the same time raise the conflict's international profile.

To date, the separatist campaign of violence in the majority Malay Muslim provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala has rested almost entirely on two main pillars. One has consisted of attacks using home-made bombs or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Focused primarily against the security forces, but also occasionally against civilian targets in urban areas, the IED war has grown technically and tactically more sophisticated and shows no sign of abating.

The insurgents' second main tactic has involved a relentless campaign of daily targeted killings. Sowing terror across the region, insurgents have killed and wounded hundreds of innocent Buddhist civilians, local Muslims deemed to be collaborating with the authorities, and off-duty security force personnel of both religions.

By contrast, direct insurgent attacks on security force units have played a far less prominent role in the conflict - and for good reason: both the military and the police are far better trained and equipped and almost guaranteed to win anything more than the briefest exchange of fire.

Attacks on patrols and bases that have taken place over the years have been mostly pin-prick affairs involving two or three gunmen firing a few shots and then beating a rapid retreat. Despite the attackers enjoying the choice of time and place of attack, security force casualties have been the exception rather than the rule.

Two conclusions that are not mutually exclusive can be drawn from this pattern of attacks. The first is that local village-based guerrillas known as RKK (from the Malay Runda Kumpulan Kecil or "small patrol group") have generally lacked confidence, experience and possibly ammunition. The second is that insurgents have been conducting live-ammunition training exercises, effectively learning on the job.

Bolder tactics
Last year, however, saw a clear change in the pattern of conflict as insurgent numbers, boldness and tactical skills all increased.

The most striking reflection of this shift was a series of incidents involving guerrillas operating in platoon-strength where 30 or 40 fighters combined for a single assault. According to Thai military sources, these units have been composed mostly of more experienced RKK elements, but they have also been stiffened by so-called "commandos", seasoned guerrilla fighters with specialist training in fields such as close-quarter assault, demolition and explosives, and combat medical aid.

Most of these operations have been carried out in several core districts of Narathiwat - notably Ra-ngae, Rueso and Sri Sakhorn - a zone which has developed as a focus of guerrilla activity for several reasons.

These include a decade or more of preparatory political work by the Coordinate faction of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN-C), the driving force behind the insurgency; topography dominated by the mountainous spine of the Budo range that facilitates movement and training; and the zone's centrality to other important areas of guerrilla activity, notably Cho Airong, Yi-ngor and Bacho districts in Narathiwat, Raman and Muang districts in Yala, and Ka-phor in Pattani.

An ominous indication of the insurgents' new tactics came one year ago on January 19, 2011, when an estimated 40 fighters backed by local support elements overran a Royal Thai Army (RTA) company base in Maruebo Ork sub-district of Ra-ngae, killing four soldiers, wounding six and seizing at least 50 fire-arms, mostly automatic rifles and machine-guns.

The operation, meticulously planned and executed, marked the largest concentration of insurgent firepower since the watershed Cho Airong district arms raid of January 2004 that effectively marked the beginning of full-blown insurgency.

Given the lull that followed, it might have been tempting to view the Ra-ngae attack as a lucky "one-off". But events in the second half of 2011 suggested that the business-as-usual complacency that affects many security force units after eight years of conflict would be misplaced.

On the evening of August 24, an estimated 20 insurgents attacked a post manned by Rangers and defense volunteers in Thepa district of Songkhla province in an assault which killed two. In the early hours of the following day, another well-planned attack involving at least 30 guerrillas operating in several teams targeted the compound of a Muslim village defense force in Yaha district of Yala. Backed by several IEDs, the attack and an ambush of Ranger reinforcements killed two and wounded four.

In late September, in Narathiwat's Rueso, a group of at least 15 insurgents dressed in Ranger-style black uniforms emerged from the jungle in Rueso-ork sub-district in a brazen daylight operation that, typically, rested on careful reconnaissance and planning. Opening fire at close range, they killed four soldiers resting between teacher escort shifts in an orchard next to a school. A fifth soldier was wounded and five automatic rifles were seized.

The most telling pointer to an emerging trend also played out in Rueso in an attack in the early hours of December 13. Clearly intended to replicate the successful assault of January 19 in Ra-ngae, the operation brought together a force of around 40 insurgents divided into separate teams for a 2 am assault on the compound of the tambol administration organization (TAO) of Suwaree sub-district which doubles as a military base.

As in January, the attack opened with a shower of grenades from M-79 launchers and rifle fire closely followed by an attempt to breach the perimeter - in this case a wall rather than a barbed wire entanglement - and overrun part or all of the facility. At the same time, a second team launched a diversionary attack on another army post some two kilometers away while a third used an electric saw to cut down rubber trees and block a road to prevent security force reinforcement or pursuit.

The plan came to grief when two IEDs placed against the wall - one weighing some 20 kilograms - failed to blow a breach wide enough to allow the attackers to enter. Significantly, despite the set-back the insurgents displayed the same discipline and planning that had been on display in January and immediately withdrew without becoming bogged down in a protracted firefight.

Another more successful operation involving the same tactics and almost certainly many of the same fighters followed on January 6, 2012 near the district center of Rueso. The latest attack also involved an estimated 30-50 insurgents targeting a Territorial Defense Volunteers (TDV) outpost guarding a government employment project.

The main assault group used wire-cutters to break through perimeter defenses and storm the facility with a range of automatic weapons (including interestingly a Minimi light machine gun and Uzi sub-machine guns seized in the Ra-ngae attack one year earlier).

Two TDVs were killed in the room where they were sleeping, while three others were wounded but managed to flee into the darkness. The attackers seized five assault rifles before withdrawing. A second team, meanwhile, had cut down trees to block the approach road while a third staged a minor diversionary attack on a police post some 800 meters from the main target.

Point-blank range
In addition to staging larger assaults aimed at seizing ammunition and weapons, insurgent tactics have also shifted in other ways which, while less dramatic, reflect their same growing confidence and boldness.

In 2011, daylight assaults by groups of insurgents armed with assault rifles and riding on the back of pick-up trucks increased notably. Most of these attacks, launched at point-blank range, targeted lightly-manned traffic check points in Narathiwat. But one in March involved guerrillas on two pick-ups opening fire across the median divide of a major highway on a convoy of military buses, wounding 22 marines returning from leave.

Noteworthy, too, have been a growing number of reports of targeted killings carried out by insurgents on motorcycles in which the shooter, riding pillion, uses an assault rifle rather than an easily concealed hand-gun. There has also been a marked increase in hit-and-run attacks on army posts and police stations using M-79 grenade launchers, now often in daylight rather than by the cover of night.

In 2009, M-79s were used in only four attacks during the whole year. By 2010, that figure had risen to an average of 1.8 incidents per month. In 2011, however, they were used on average in four attacks each month. December 2011 saw the highest number of attacks using grenade launchers of any month to date, where 13 of 17 attacks on security force posts involved M-79s.

Notwithstanding the analysis put forward by some observers that the southern insurgency remains a fragmented affair with no coherent command structure, it seems highly unlikely this pattern of events is unfolding by chance. It would also be naive to give much credence to the cheerful explanations often proffered by senior police officers that major attacks are retaliatory strikes by desperate insurgents and/or angry drug dealers.

As Thai army sources point out, the organizational structure of BRN-C's military wing has long been configured for operations by larger units. In recent years the emphasis on the ground has been largely on establishing and maintaining village-level RKK teams of six or seven men. This has been reflected in press coverage that has all but elevated the term RKK to a separatist party in its own right.

But on paper, at least, the BRN-C structure aims at building larger units. In ascending order these are 12-man sections or "regu" composed of two RKK teams; 36-man platoons or "platong" that group three "regu"; and finally companies or "kompi" operating at a district level and made up of three platoons or 108 fighters.

Developments in 2011 suggest efforts are underway to give this military blueprint some traction on the ground. There are arguably two reasons for this. At the political level, Bangkok's ongoing failure to tackle the roots of Malay Muslim disaffection - official impunity, a broken justice system and the need for administrative reform - has allowed the insurgent organization to continue to proselytize, recruit and grow.

At the military level, most notably in central Narathiwat, district commanders are developing the command and control skills and experience required for larger offensive operations. This means the ability to concentrate manpower for sudden attacks followed by the rapid concealment of weapons and dispersal back into the civilian population.

Strategic dilemma
For their part, Thai security forces confront a classic counter-insurgency dilemma. Given that the guerrillas remain mainly community-based and focused on daily killings and bombings, army strategy has necessarily been based on area domination, spreading a net that sees troops scattered in relatively small - and thus vulnerable - units over a wide geographical area.

Such offensive operations as are conducted usually entail raids on specific houses or locations based on tip-offs and aim at arresting or killing local commanders, or unearthing arms caches. However, the security forces' overall pattern of deployment is defensive and focused on two main missions.

The first, which has met with decidedly mixed success, is to ensure the security of the civilian population and a semblance of normality in the restive region. Each day, thousands of armed personnel are tied down in escorting teachers to and from state schools and Buddhist monks on their alms collections - routine daily activities that have proven vulnerable to insurgent ambush. Others troops are out on foot and vehicle patrols or standing at traffic check-points. At night, thousands of soldiers, police and volunteers are tied down guarding schools, government offices, and their own outposts (essentially surrendering the space beyond to the insurgents).

The second, related mission is to prevent the insurgent political organization backed by its RKK enforcers from taking over whole villages and setting up parallel government structures - as occurred in many villages during the period spanning 2003-2007.

So-called Peace Development Units (Nuay Pattana Santi) have been on the front-line of this effort. These 26-man joint teams of Rangers, local Muslim TDVs and police are embedded in villages where insurgent infrastructure is assessed as still strong. Their job is to win over locals through small-scale development projects while at the same time developing intelligence sources and attempting to identify the insurgents' village-level political committee members and RKK operatives.

This pattern of widely scattered, penny-packet defensive deployment inevitably creates vulnerabilities, however. And as attacks in 2011 have shown, these increase dramatically when the insurgents cease to operate in teams of four or five and begin to concentrate in well-armed, hard-hitting units of 20, 30 or even 50 fighters.

How far and at what speed insurgent combat capabilities are likely to develop is difficult to assess. The rebels face substantial constraints of their own. The most obvious is the lead-time required by perennially risk-averse commanders to mount large-scale assaults involving platoon-size units. Events in 2011 indicated the reconnaissance, planning, and logistical preparation required for a major attack takes weeks or even months rather than days. And insurgent attacks are never launched without a very high probability of success.

Secondly, the insurgents are also constrained by shortages of ammunition - although paradoxically this factor increases the pressure to mount more frequent large attacks aimed at seizing more ammunition and arms. Nevertheless, given the trajectory of conflict over 2011, the risk of an intensification in the coming months is real and could have repercussions at various levels.

Militarily, it will demand a more aggressive response from the security forces, including probably a return to the large-scale cordon-and-search operations seen in late 2007 and early 2008 that involved round-ups of scores, and before long, hundreds of detainees. This would do nothing to win still skeptical Malay Muslim hearts-and-minds; indeed a return to the strategy would play directly into the hands of the propaganda teams of the insurgents' political wing.

A more robust counter-insurgency effort could also derail military plans for the new force structure in the border provinces which is currently emerging. These plans envisage moving regular RTA battalions from other regions of the country back to their home bases and turning counter-insurgency operations over to the recently raised and locally-based 15th Division (part of the southern 4th Army) which is backed importantly by para-military Ranger regiments.

An escalating conflict could also impact on the still tentative process of contacts and dialogue between government and army officials on one side and representatives of BRN-C and the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) on the other. In abeyance since the elections of July 2011 and the advent of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's Puea Thai party-led government, talks are due to begin again in early 2012 but are far from immune to developments on the ground and perceptions of each side's relative strength.

Indeed, far from clear at present is whether escalating insurgent operations are, as some observers have suggested, a reflection of separatist frustration over the lack of progress at the talks; or whether BRN-C's political leaders and military commanders are simply content to operate along essentially independent - but not yet divergent - tracks. The first half of 2012 may well provide an answer to that question.

Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based security analyst for IHS-Jane's.

SOURCE:  ASIA TIMES 12 JANUARY 2012,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NA12Ae01.html